Recently we had a chance to engage a group of young scholars who in all probability will be the generation that brokers the sustainable peace we are all looking for in the middle-east region.  To hear these observations from their perspective was a truly enlightening experience.  Due to the sensitivity of subject matter, they chose to remain anonymous.  Who can blame them in this age of everything you say will be used against you.  Its a worthy read for all no matter what side of the conversation you are on.

Iran’s Nuclear Weapons Capability

Almost a year into his first term, President Barak Obama’s outline for a radically different policy towards Iran is starting to come into focus. Despite the results of the recent contested Iranian elections, the momentum presents a rare window of opportunity to reshape US-Iranian relations for the benefit of both countries. America has much to gain from a renewed relationship with Iran, but up to date our policy has lacked consideration of many basic principles central to Iran’s position without which US policy will not be effective.

The past 30 years of US-Iranian relations have been characterized by deep mistrust which has placed the Iranian regime on the defensive. Iranian animosity towards American policy is based on several key events including: Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) involvement in the ousting of democratically elected Prime Minister, Mohammad Mosaddeq; US support for the Iranian Shah, whom many Iranians saw as a brutal and despotic leader; military and financial support to Saddam Hussein during the Iran-Iraq war, in which Iran lost over 1 million people.

Many of these memories have left a bitter taste towards US engagement in Iran, which was only amplified in America’s post-9/11 policy, when the US sought to intensify Iran’s political and economic isolation. Heavy economic sanctions towards the Iranian regime managed to weaken the country’s economy, but resulted in scarce policy change, and instead continue to serve as a scapegoat for the Iranian government’s domestic policy failures.

US-led regime change in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as the general US military presence in the region have further pushed the country on the defensive by raising suspicions that the US is also actively seeking to topple the Iranian government. From a security perspective, the Iranian government is well aware that having the capacity to enrich uranium would give it increased leverage in asserting its regional influence and in negotiating with Europe and America. However, there are several factors which indicate that Iran is not pursuing nuclear weapons capability for offensive purposes, but rather seeks to gain independence in the process of attaining nuclear energy and the capacity to assemble a nuclear warhead.

The Iranian regime is cognizant of the fact that assembling a nuclear weapon would solidify regional suspicions of its expansionary agenda, as well as provide the necessary ammunition for regional/international actors seeking to justify an attack on the country.  Furthermore, both the founder of the Islamic Republic, Ayatollah Khomeini, and its current Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, have issued numerous religious decrees branding the possession and use of a nuclear weapon as un-Islamic.

Addressing Iran’s continued quest for nuclear capability entails understanding the significance of the nuclear file not only militarily and politically, but also socially and economically. In its quest to keep the country free of Western interference, and in response to its increased isolation, the Iranian government has pursued an agenda of self-sufficiency in industries which are key to the country’s survival. What many Western policy makers often overlook is that in Iranian society, developing the capability to harness nuclear energy for peaceful purposes is a pursuit closely tied to national pride, and a major step forward in the country’s development and modernization. Therefore asking Iran to cease its uranium enrichment program would be politically unfeasible for any faction of its government. Even just from a purely economic point of view, having access to nuclear energy would relieve Iran’s annual 6-7 billion dollar energy spending, and allow it to free up more of its oil reserves for export.

American policy towards Iran should be sensitive to the aforementioned historical and socio-economic factors which have deepened mistrust between the two countries. The following recommendations outline a high-level strategy which the US should implement in order to begin capitalizing on Iran’s influence in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well on other regional issues central to US interests:

1- Provide security assurances to the Iranian government that the US does not seek to weaken or topple its regime. In addition to opening up relations with Iran, this move will provide Iranian reformists with much needed political capital in the face of hard-liners who are opposed to reestablishing ties with the US.

2- Take the moral high ground and acknowledge the historical events which have contributed to the atmosphere of mistrust between the two nations. The Iranian population will perceive this as a reconciliatory gesture by the US as well as a sign of respect, which will in turn make it politically easier for Iranian officials to make compromises without losing face.

3- Acknowledge the right of Iran to pursue nuclear technology for peaceful purposes (as outlined in the Non Proliferation Treaty), and closely monitor nuclear activities through the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). This removes Iranian suspicions that the US is meddling in the standard procedures outlined in the IAEA mandate, a move seen as infringing on Iranian sovereignty.

4- Back verbal assurances of a new relationship by taking practical and meaningful actions. These could include: halting sanctions for a specific time period; allowing financial institutions to re-connect with the Iranian banking sector; allowing commerce between US and multiple sectors of the Iranian economy; encouraging an increase in cultural exchanges in arts, music, sports and academia.

5- Cease focusing exclusively on the nuclear file and address issues of mutual interest such as regional stability, specifically in Afghanistan and Iraq. Having two of their neighbors in turmoil is against Iranian interests, as it destabilizes Iran’s domestic affairs and burdens the country’s economy with a large refugee population. Elements within the Iranian regime which actively contribute to insecurity in Iraq and Afghanistan justify their actions on the apparent threat of a US attack on Iran. If such a threat is removed, Iran would not be able to justify these actions.

6- Expand joint sessions with Iranian delegates to include representatives of the Supreme Leader, the National Security Council, and the Council of Guardians, all of whom exert more influence on Iranian foreign policy then the president and his cabinet.

7-  Reassure Israel that any negotiation with Iran will not be at the expense of US and Israeli relations, but also reassess the extent to which US policy in the region should be based on the tenuous threat that Iran might use a nuclear weapon to attack Israel. In Iran’s view, having the capacity to put together a nuclear weapon is a rational way to address the security dilemma presented by Israel’s nuclear capacity. However, in addition to the reasons mentioned above as to why Iran would not assemble a nuclear weapon, it should also be noted that Jerusalem is one of the holiest sites for Shia Muslims and it would be political suicide for any Iranian regime to even contemplate using a nuclear weapon on Israeli soil.